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Abstract 
This paper examines whether workers are rewarded for inconsistent performances by 
salary premia. Some earlier research suggests that performance inconsistency leads to 
salary premia while other research finds premia for consistent performances. Using 
detailed salary and performance data, we find that inconsistency is rewarded for some 
dimensions of performance, specifically those where creativity is important and 
outcomes have higher variance. We find salary penalties for inconsistent performances 
in those dimensions that are basic requirements of successful team production. 
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1. Introduction 
Following Lazear (1998), a body of personnel economics literature has considered 
whether workers who demonstrate greater performance inconsistency than 
comparable workers of similar average productivity are rewarded more highly. Lazear 
conjectured that there would be an ‘upside potential to risky workers’ so inconsistent 
performers would be more highly rewarded in salary due to their capability of 
providing extraordinarily high productivity albeit on a few occasions. Firms would 
consider this unusually high performance to be an option value and would reward 
workers more highly to reflect this. 
In some cases, principals prefer consistent performances to volatile ones by their 
agents (Bodvarsson & Brastow, 1998; Deutscher, Gürtler, Prinz, & Weimar, 2017; 
Dickinson & Oaxaca, 2014), in other cases, researchers suggest that principals prefer 
inconsistent agents to consistent ones (Bollinger & Hotchkiss, 2003; Deutscher & 
Büschemann, 2016). Although existing literature finds evidence for either case, the 
question under which conditions inconsistency is penalized or rewarded remains 
ambiguous, especially because the necessary conditions are not identified. Beyond the 
aforementioned studies, Andersson, Freedman, Haltiwanger, Lane, and Shaw (2009) 
show that software firms that are active in areas with highly skewed positive returns 
(e.g., video game developers) pay higher upfront salaries and offer higher 
compensation growth. The analysis, however, does not consider inconsistency and 
salary differences are explained by firms’ product payoff dispersions. 
To solve the puzzle, one could try to compare two industries, one in which 
inconsistency is punished and one in which it is rewarded, and then identify the 
determinants of the differences. However, such an analysis is very difficult because 
industries differ by many factors and it would be impossible to identify the relevant 
factors. Another strategy could be to analyze such differences within a single industry. 
This approach would require an industry in which performance inconsistency is 
measured very precisely and in which there are some tasks in which workers are 
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penalized and some tasks in which workers are rewarded for performance 
inconsistency. Empirical testing for upside potential of risky workers is very difficult 
in most industries as individual workers’ mean and variance of productivity cannot 
be cleanly derived (Ernst & Vitt, 2000; Garen, 1988). Self-reported survey data are 
unhelpful in this context and results from firm-specific data may not easily generalize 
(Barrett & O'Connell, 2001; Chapman & Southwick, 1991), because cross-firm 
comparisons are not possible. Instead, sports data offer good opportunities to study 
the relationship between worker salary and variations in productivity since we can 
extract performance data at individual worker (player) level for many different 
competing firms (clubs) over time (seasons) into a large data set. Kahn (2000) 
emphasizes that the sports industry presents a valuable laboratory setting to analyze 
labor markets. In recent years, many researchers have turned to sports data to analyze 
numerous research questions in management, economics, and other social science 
fields. 
We exploit detailed European football performance data from the top division 
of one of the Top Five European football leagues, i.e., the Italian Serie A. We define 
performance inconsistency as performance variation and are particularly interested in 
the effects of performance variation on salary. Some players might be rewarded for 
consistency of performances (e.g., defenders) while others might be rewarded for 
performance variation as their roles require creativity which, in turn, generates 
inconsistency. Such features of heterogeneity may be important in a wider complex 
organizational setting. Especially in settings where creative workers combine with 
workers doing more mundane tasks in a repeated team production context, e.g., 
celebrity chefs and immediate co-workers in a restaurant, star actors and background 
artists in a theater production, or surgeons in the operating room and assisting nurses. 
Our data set facilitates testing of heterogeneous effects of performance on salary. 
In contrast to Deutscher and Büschemann (2016), who use the same single 
performance proxy measure (journalist ratings for player performances) for all players 
regardless of field position in the team, we use actual salary data, which is clearly 
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superior to market values and other proxies. Deutscher and Büschemann’s (2016) 
analysis of Bundesliga football lacks data on both direct salaries and player 
performances, so the authors use proxy measures. The salary proxy is a player 
valuation measure created by experts at Kicker sports magazine. The researchers argue 
that Kicker valuations are closely correlated with a subset of available salaries for 
Bundesliga players. The performance proxy is a set of subjective grade scores 
(journalists’ ratings) recorded by Kicker ranging at match level from 1 (excellent) to 6 
(very poor). Using market values as proxies for salary data (e.g., via Transfermarkt.de 
or Kicker ratings) raises several issues: (i) the algorithm to calculate market values is 
non-transparent, (ii) the algorithm does not update frequently, and (iii) crowd 
estimates cannot be verified or replicated (Müller, Simons, & Weinmann, 2017). 
Market values conflate transfer fees with salary payments. Thrane (2019) shows the 
limitations of market values as predictors of actual salary in Norwegian football. 
Although expert ratings might have their merits, Gauriot and Page (2018) show 
that managers, journalists, and sports fans significantly overrate observed outcomes 
when they evaluate performance, i.e., they demonstrate outcome-bias. Specifically, 
journalists have a tendency to overrate players two-thirds of a standard deviation 
when a goal is scored compared to when no goal is scored (Gauriot & Page, 2018). 
Outcome bias occurs in settings where ex-post outcomes influence an individual’s 
judgements of a given situation, although the ex-ante information was identical (Baron 
& Hershey, 1988; Lefgren, Platt, & Price, 2015). 
Going beyond previous research, we show that salary premia in our setting are 
only offered for particular dimensions of performance. To the best of our knowledge, 
this is the first paper to empirically show that inconsistency is rewarded for some 
dimensions of performances, while it is penalized in others. The existing literature on 
the effect of performance inconsistency on worker salaries does not differentiate 
between differences of tasks within a team and therefore cannot capture the insights 
generated by our study. In short, performance inconsistency in defensive tasks is 
penalized while performance inconsistency in attacking and goal scoring is rewarded. 
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As in any other industry, workers need to provide various skillsets for different tasks. 
Some tasks are more repetitive or administrative and others require more creative 
skills, where effort, productivity, and salary returns have disproportionate 
relationships to performance attributes. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: section 2 provides the 
necessary theoretical background, section 3 presents our data and empirical model. In 
section 4, we analyze empirical results, ans we conclude the paper in section 5. 
 
2. Background 
A widely used regression model to explain earnings as a function of schooling and 
experience is Mincer’s (1974) framework, a cornerstone of empirical labor economics, 
that has been replicated in many studies around the world (Ashenfelter & Alan, 1994; 
Bils & Klenow, 2000; Card & Krueger, 1992; Willis, 1987). More-educated workers earn 
higher salaries; additional years of work experience and age have a positive albeit 
diminishing effect on salaries (i.e., upward sloping and concave functional form). 
Within sports, researchers have focused largely on Mincer’s wage equation to model 
salary outcomes, where age, experience, position, national team selection, team effects, 
country of origin, and performance have been used to determine salaries. Bryson, 
Frick, and Simmons (2013) find that age, height, goals per game, international 
appearances, and two-footedness increase salaries. In general, offensive players earn 
more (Lucifora & Simmons, 2003). Extraordinarily talented football players, i.e., 
superstars earn up to 34% more (Lucifora & Simmons, 2003) and according to Bryson, 
Rossi, and Simmons (2014), migrant players earn more than domestic ones, which is 
partly explained by superstar effects. Furthermore, evidence for superstar effects is 
offered by Carrieri, Principe, and Raitano (2018) using Google citations as a measure 
of player popularity. 
Rosen’s (1981) seminal paper formally analyzed the economics of superstars. 
He showed that marginal differences in talent can lead to huge differences in earnings. 
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When talent is highly valued by consumers, the most talented individuals earn 
disproportionately high incomes due to economies of scale in audience consumption 
of the performer’s talent. In modern European football, audience consumption refers 
to global broadcast coverage of matches featuring superstar players. Even regular 
league games are broadcast worldwide live across all major continents.  
Furthermore, Adler (1985) shows that equally talented individuals might have 
huge differences in earnings because consumers are more familiar with one talent 
compared than the other, suggesting that it might be an individual’s celebrity status 
associated with accumulated reputation, rather than that individual’s talent leading to 
higher earnings. Both Rosen’s and Adler’s explanations of superstar effects are 
complementary and not mutually exclusive: to qualify as a superstar, a player needs 
strong performances, high popularity, and the ability to reach a large audience (i.e., 
players like Messi and Ronaldo have all three attributes). 
Superstar effects are most likely to occur in arts, entertainment, and sports but 
they are also observed in other fields. Researchers have focused on the earnings of 
CEOs (Malmendier & Tate, 2009), Wall Street analysts (Groysberg, Lee, & Nanda, 
2008), scientists (Narin & Breitzman, 1995), actors (Ravid, 1999), and athletes (Carrieri 
et al., 2018; Lucifora & Simmons, 2003). Using several regression methods, including 
unconditional quantile regressions, and Italian salary data similar to ours, Carrieri et 
al. (2018) show that football players’ popularity is the most important determinant of 
salary in the top decile of the player salary distribution, outweighing player 
performance and bargaining power, thereby supporting Adler’s (1985) theory. 
Some researchers have turned to sports data to find empirical evidence for 
Lazear’s (1998) theory of upside potential of risky workers: Bodvarsson and Brastow 
(1998) show that managers prefer consistent over volatile performances by analyzing 
data from the National Basketball Association (NBA), i.e., inconsistent NBA players 
earn less because they need to be monitored, which is costly. Bollinger and Hotchkiss 
(2003) empirically test baseball player’s salaries and performances and find that 
inconsistent baseball players earn a salary premium compared to their colleagues who 
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have the same average performance but do not offer larger upside potential. Deutscher 
and Büschemann (2016) and Deutscher et al. (2017) study the relationship between 
player salaries and performance variation in the German Bundesliga and in the NBA, 
respectively. For German football, the researchers offer evidence that players are more 
highly rewarded for more inconsistent performance. For the NBA, the results point in 
the opposite direction, where greater consistency is rewarded by a salary premium. 
Thus, these two papers deliver contradictory results from two different sports leagues.   
Beyond sports industry related studies, Dickinson and Oaxaca (2014) use 
experimental settings to show that inconsistent workers are more likely to be hired but 
earn lower salaries. Andersson et al. (2009) argue that there is a strong connection 
between talent and product innovation in the software industry, a sector that has large 
economies of scale in production and is characterized by highly skewed payoffs for 
both firms and skilled workers. Indeed, some software products may generate extra-
ordinary revenues while others might turn out to generate large losses. This is often a 
result of winner-take-all markets. The researchers define star employees as those 
project managers and engineers who have better abilities to pick projects with high 
positive returns. As such, they conjecture that star employees would increase project 
payoffs both in less risky industries and in high-risk industries. However, the project 
payoffs are much larger in markets that have high variance and high skewness. Using 
OLS and quantile regressions, the researchers show that firms with higher revenues 
pay higher salaries but they emphasize that product payoff dispersions have a 
significant positive effect on starting salaries and salary growth.  
Similar to Andersson et al.’s (2009) arguments about the software industry, 
scoring and winning in European football are heavily dependent on athletes’ talents. 
Here again, club managers need to pick the best talents that maximize their club’s 
winning percentage, and therefore, revenues. European football is known as a low-
scoring and low-numbers game. Given the nature of the game, the relationship 
between effort and payoffs (e.g., goals scored) can be highly skewed. Not only can an 
additional scored goal decide whether a team wins or loses, winning the league leads 
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to extraordinary prize money for the winning club but also to enormous additional 
revenues in subsequent seasons because winners qualify for prestigious tournaments, 
e.g., UEFA Champions League (UCL), with high prizes
1. On the other hand, losing teams at the bottom of the league face relegation. 
An additional goal that is conceded might lead to an extraordinary loss of revenues 
(e.g., from TV-rights, stadium attendance, and merchandising, etc.) because there is a 
steep drop in revenues between top divisions and subsequent lower divisions. 
According to Dietl, Franck, and Lang (2008), clubs overinvest in talents because of 
these unequal industry payoff structures. The structure of rewards in football 
competitions points to potential large returns to teams and players from success 
generated by high levels of player performance. The question we pose is whether 
player salary returns are increased or decreased by higher performance variation. 
 
3. Data and Methods 
In European football, two teams compete against each other with 11 players on each 
side; the team that scores more goals wins, hence, the objective team production 
function is to produce more goals. Players have different tasks, i.e., goal keepers guard 
the goal and are allowed to use their hands, defenders try to keep the ball as far away 
from their goals as possible, midfielders connect defense and attack (some have 
coordinating tasks, others have creative tasks), and strikers need to be creative to 
outplay the opponent’s defenders in order to score goals. To oversimplify: attackers 
proactively seek to outplay defenders, while defenders react and try to minimize any 
mistakes. 
To study the heterogeneous relationship between inconsistent worker 
performance and earnings, we require a detailed dataset with information on 
                                                 
1 Juventus, Roma, and Napoli qualified for the UCL after ranking 1st, 2nd, and 3rd respectively 
in the 2016/17 Serie A season. In the subsequent 2017/18 UCL season, these teams generated additional 
revenues between 39m € and 83m €. For a detailed list of UCL revenue distributions, see: 
https://www.uefa.com/MultimediaFiles/Download/competitions/General/02/57/82/51/2578251_DOW
NLOAD.pdf 
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numerous performance metrics and earnings. For this, we use player performance data 
from eight seasons (2009/10 to 2016/17) of the Italian Serie A. Our choice of Italy Serie 
A is motivated by availability of both player salary and player performance data. Italy 
is the only European country for which reliable and consistent football player salary 
data are published in a comprehensive manner over a long period (Bryson et al., 2014; 
Carrieri et al., 2018). 
The rich player performance data set was purchased from Panini Digital, an 
official data provider for clubs of the Italian Serie A. In total, we count 84,499 player-
match observations. The sample reduces to 78,302 player match observations because 
we exclude goalkeepers from our analysis. Assessing individual goalkeeper 
performances is very difficult compared to defenders, midfielders, and forwards. Our 
salary data come from the most popular sports newspaper La Gazzetta dello sport and 
are published in September of each year, since 2008. The salary data represent gross 
basic pay and exclude performance-related and other bonuses. In order to estimate 
salary models, we collapse our match-level performance statistics into season-level 
aggregates.  
 
3.1 Performance Measures 
We measure individual player performances by numerous on-field metrics (e.g., balls 
played, successful passes, recovered balls, shots on target). Players are assigned 
different positions by the data provider (e.g., defender, midfielder, forward) which 
require different sets of skills. We take the position categories as given by the data 
providers. Although some players might be more versatile and therefore are assigned 
to different positions in different games by the managers, they are usually playing the 
same position in a given season. 
Thousands of actions (events) are measured by Panini Digital, of which some 
are more important for team match outcomes than others. For this reason, we proceed 
as follows: First, we use a single composite performance index called IVG that is 
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provided by Panini Digital. The measure is used by Italian Serie A clubs media outlets, 
and researchers (Fumarco & Rossi, 2018; Montanari, Silvestri, & Bof, 2008) for player 
performance evaluation.  
The IVG measure is an index that is calculated by an algorithm that includes 
more than thousand in-game actions. The measure has been developed by researchers 
at the Department of Statistical Sciences of the University of Bologna, together with a 
team of football experts that are all current or past football coaches (e.g., Sacchi, Lippi, 
Zeman, Lucescu, Ancelotti). This index covers several situations (e.g., player in 
possession, player dictating the pass, player recovering the ball) and compares each 
player to a historical average, i.e., a benchmark that is specific to that role (Fumarco 
& Rossi, 2018). The IVG can take values from 1 (minimum) to 30 (maximum), and has 
a sample mean around 17. The index may increase for defenders that are able to 
contribute to attack (e.g., shots) or decrease for attackers that are caught offside or lose 
the ball; there are penalties and extra points for each role. Scoring is highly rewarded 
with additional extra points, the extra points for goals decrease with every additional 
goal scored in a match (e.g., 4 points for the first goal, 3 points for the second goal, 2 
points for the third goal, 1 point for any additional goal above 3). 
Second, we apply factor analysis to reduce the number of performance metrics 
to arrive at a more representative and smaller number of performance variables that 
can summarize more accurately different skillsets for different players. A very similar 
multivariate technique for data reduction is called Principal Component Analysis 
(PCA) (Jackson, 1991). Both methods reduce the dimensionality of the data into a 
smaller number of unobserved variables expressed as linear combinations of observed 
variables. Other than factor analysis, however, PCA assumes that there is no unique 
variance of the observed variables and that the total variance is equal to the common 
variances. 
Factor Analysis (and PCA) is used in many fields, including social sciences 
(Cattell, 1978; Gorsuch, 1983), economics (Bai & Wang, 2016; Bhatti, Al-Shanfari, & 
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Hossain, 2006; Huang-Lachmann, Hannemann, & Guenther, 2018; Studer & 
Winkelmann, 2017), and biostatistics (Van Belle, Fisher, Haegerty, & Lumley, 2004). 
We collected data for 26 on-field metrics (see Tables 1 and 2) to assess player 
performances. For example, a defender’s performance is assessed by observing the 
number of interceptions, blocked shots, tackles, etc. he had, while an attacker’s 
performance is assessed by the number of shots on target, dribblings, assists, etc. Using 
factor analysis, we reduce these observable and measurable variables (e.g., shots on 
target, tackles) into a set of fewer underlying latent variables, i.e., factors that explain 
the interrelationships among observed variables. At the center of the analysis is the 
covariance among the observed variables: variables that are highly correlated will 
share a lot of variance. The assumption is that the observed variables are linear 
combinations of the underlying and unobserved factors. The procedure reduces 
dimensionality because the factors that share common variance (communality) can 
explain more of the variance of an individual observed variable (Bhatti et al., 2006; 
Mueller & Kim, 1978). 
Other than PCA, factor analysis assumes that there are latent factors that better 
explain the relationship between correlating observed variables. This supports our 
decision to apply factor analysis instead of PCA: Even if we can measure the number 
of passes, shots, etc., we do not know how these variables relate to ability and effort. 
Ability itself can be individual (a player’s own skillset) and peer-related, that is, the 
ability to interact in a team. These are intangible factors. Nonetheless, we have also 
tested our models using PCA with results available on request. The resulting tables 
(eigenvalues, explained variance, factor loadings) are different due to the different 
procedure; however, the patterns of the extracted components and the interpretations 
thereof are very similar. Thus, the regression results using the two methods are not 
remarkably different. Indeed, previous researchers have shown that PCA and factor 
analysis show very similar results (Velicer & Jackson, 1990). 
 
[Insert Table 1 here] 
12 
 
[Insert Table 2 here] 
 
Usually the procedure takes several steps. (1) The factor analysis is run on a set 
of observed variables, in our case 26 (see Table 2), and factors are extracted. Table 3 
shows the eigenvalues (i.e., the variance) of the factors. Following Kaiser (1960), we 
drop all factors that have eigenvalues lower than unity. This leaves us with three 
factors. Although there are multiple approaches to select the number of factors to 
retain, the Kaiser rule is the most commonly used. (2) Factors are rotated to achieve a 
simple structure that allows us to more easily interpret the results. Without factor 
rotation, most of the observed variables are loaded on the first factor so that the first 
factor explains most variance. Achieving a simple structure is helpful because each 
factor can define a distinct cluster of interrelated variables and the results are more 
easily interpretable (Cattell, 1978; Mueller & Kim, 1978). We use oblique rotation for 
our analysis, because the factors are correlated (i.e., a player can have strong 
playmaking skills and striking skills)2. Note that the underlying data does not change 
here. Results of the rotated factor analysis are shown in Tables 4 and 5. 
 
[Insert Table 3 here] 
 
After rotating the factors, we focus on interpreting the results. The factor pattern 
matrix in Table 5 shows the partial standardized regression coefficients of each 
observed variable (rows) with a specific factor (columns). For instance, 0.772 is the 
effect of factor 1 on the observed variable balls played, controlling for factors 2 and 3; 
while 0.450 is the effect of factor 2 on balls played controlling for factors 1 and 2. 
                                                 
2 We run tests with orthogonal rotation, which assumes that the factors are uncorrelated and 
imposes that assumption on the data. The factor loadings lead to very similar interpretations of the 
factors and the results in our main econometric model are not remarkably different. Because oblique 
rotation does not impose orthogonality on the data, the approach is suitable for both uncorrelated and 
correlated factors. 
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Squaring the loadings, e.g., 0.7722 = 0.60, gives us factor 1’s unique contribution of the 
variance in ‘balls played’, controlling for factors 2 and 3. 
The uniqueness column presents the portion of variance that is not explained 
by the three factors. To calculate the communality of each observed variable, we 
subtract each uniqueness value from 1. For instance, balls played has a communality of 
0.88, meaning that 0.88 of the variance of balls played is accounted for by the three 
factors. Variables with higher uniqueness (lower communality) are not as well 
explained by the three retained factors as those variables with lower uniqueness.  
A closer look on Table 5 helps us to interpret the specific skillsets for players. 
For instance, the factor loadings for balls played (0.772), balls played in opposition half 
(0.818), successful passes (0.741), useful plays (0.851), useful plays in opposition half 
(0.904) are all very high for factor one: they describe playmaking skills. Players 
associated with high values of this factor have the ability to control and direct the ball. 
Moreover, they also contribute to creative attacking play, as the loadings for assists 
(0.520) and useful short passes in opposition half (0.494) indicate. It is not surprising 
that most midfielders score high on this factor. In contrast, factor two explains 
defensive skills, clearly visible by the high loadings of recovered balls (0.904), 
recovered balls in defensive area (0.946), anticipations (0.700), interceptions (0.578), 
and clearances (0.804). The third factor describes typical striker skills: loadings on 
shots (0.715), shots on target (0.828), goal chances (0.834), and goals (0.726) are all high. 
We can see that these three factors, i.e., skillsets, are well correlated with the player 
positions. 
Having extracted the three factors (playmaking, defense, striker), we predict 
factor scores for every player-match observation to see how players have performed 
on a given skillset in a game. This step is important because include the predicted 
factor scores into our main regression analysis. Technically, statistical software 
packages use regression methods to predict factor scores. After predicting the factor 
score, we calculate the average factor score per season (e.g., average score over all 
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matches in a given season) and the standard deviation of factor score per season to 
include these newly generated performance variables in our salary regressions. 
 
[Insert Table 4 here] 
[Insert Table 5 here] 
 
 
3.2 Econometric Strategy 
Based on the Mincer wage equation and literature on salary determination in team 
sports (Bryson et al., 2014; Carrieri et al., 2018), we first model player salaries as a 
function of player productivity measures (mean and standard deviation of 
performance) and control covariates. This model faciliates testing of previous research 
findings on the effects of performance inconsistency on salaries. Because three teams 
are relegated from Serie A in each season and we do not observe Serie B earnings, some 
players in our unbalanced panel data set may appear in one season and disappear in 
the next. In addition, some players may move to other leagues or may retire. As 
salaries are outcomes of performances, we cannot regress salaries and performances 
in the same year due to endogeneity concerns. Therefore, salary levels at time t are 
regressed on performance levels and associated coefficient of variation from season t-
1, where these performances may come from a different club if the player has switched 
teams. We calculate average performance (MEAN IVG) per season for each player and 
the standard deviation of performance (SD IVG) per season for each player. Hence, 
performance variation refers to dispersion of performances within a given season 
rather than across seasons. 
We control for player age, career games, and national team selection before the 
beginning of the season. In addition, we use dummies for non-European players, for 
positions (defender, midfield, forward), and for teams. Along the lines of numerous 
papers that have used the Mincer wage regression, we expect age and the number of 
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career games to have a positive yet diminishing (i.e., concave) effect on salaries (Bryson 
et al., 2013). Appearance in the national team represents both a selection and signaling 
effect, which will also have a positive effect on salaries. While we expect foreign 
players (Bryson et al., 2014) to have higher salaries as well, reflecting unobserved 
ability and specialized skills. Moreover, we already see, from a descriptive analysis, 
that attacking players usually earn more than defending players, hence, midfielder 
and forward dummies should have a positive effect on salaries (Frick, 2007; Lucifora 
& Simmons, 2003). 
 
 
LN(SALARYt ) = α0 + α1MEAN IVGt-1 + α2SD IVGt-1 + α3AGEt + 
α4AGEt2 + α5CAREER GAMESt + α5CAREER GAMESt2 + 
α6NATIONALTEAMt + α7NONEU + Position + Team + error 
(1) 
 
Our focus is on the sign and size of α2. A negative sign shows that performance 
inconsistency, i.e., standard deviation of performance, reduces player salary. A zero 
coefficient shows no effects, indicating perhaps that team managers regard 
performance inconsistency as a consequence of luck and so should play no role in 
assessing salary in contract negotiations. A positive coefficient indicates support for 
Lazear’s hypothesis of upside potential of risky workers. 
 
[Insert Table 6 here] 
[Insert Table 7 here] 
 
 
In our second and main model, we switch our productivity measure IVG with 
the three factors from our factor analysis that explain playmaking, defensive, and 
striker skills respectively. The control covariates do not change. Here, we are interested 
on the sign and sizes of α2, α4, and α6 to see if inconsistent performances for different 
skillsets have different effects on salaries. 
 
16 
 
 
LN(SALARYt ) = α0 + α1PLAYMAYKINGt-1 + α2SD PLAYMAKINGt-1 
+ α3DEFENSEt-1 + α4SD DEFENSEt-1  + α5STRIKERt-1 + α6SD 
STRIKERt-1 + α7AGEt + α8AGEt2 + α9CAREER GAMESt + 
α10CAREER GAMESt2 + α11NATIONALTEAMt + α12NONEU + 
Position + Team + error 
(2) 
 
4. Regression Results 
We run OLS regressions for 2,049 player observations over eight seasons. Our initial 
results (see Table 8, regressions 1 to 4) show that we can replicate previous findings 
from German football. Using more precise salary and performance measures (the IVG 
single composite measure), we find that inconsistent players earn more than consistent 
ones; similar to Deutscher and Büschemann (2016). The baseline regression (1) shows 
positive and significant coefficients of average performance (MEAN IVG) and 
performance inconsistency (SD IVG). 
An increase of the average performance by one unit increases salaries by 7.4%, 
while increasing the average performance by one standard deviation would raise 
salaries by 11.3% in the OLS regression. If performance inconsistency increases by one 
unit, salaries increase by 7.9%. Our control covariates perform as expected. Age has a 
positive, yet diminishing effect on salaries. The turning point where the positive age 
effect diminishes is roughly 30 years in the OLS regression. Similarly, tenured players 
with a larger number of career games are paid higher salaries. Moreover, players that 
were selected into the national team squad are also paid higher salaries. In regression 
(2), we add player fixed effects and see that the results on player inconsistency persist. 
Naturally, the coefficients are smaller than in the OLS regression but they are positive 
and significant. Here, a one unit increase of performance inconsistency would lead to 
a salary increase of 0.4%. 
As a robustness check, we have used 78,302 player-match observations and 
corrected the productivity scores (IVG) by additionally controlling for the rank 
difference between home and away teams, derby matches, last eight matches of the 
season and the opposition team. Regressions (3) and (4) show the results of the 
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corrected productivity scores. The results persist: inconsistency is rewarded by a salary 
premium. 
 
[Insert Table 8 here] 
 
Using quantile regressions (Table 9), we test whether our results are consistent 
at different points in the conditional distribution of our dependent variable. OLS 
focuses on the average relationship between the dependent and independent 
variables; while quantile regressions test this relationship on assigned percentiles and 
median, using least absolute deviation of observations from fitted regression line and 
still using all observations for any given quantile estimate. The median regression is 
especially more robust to outliers in comparison to OLS. We regress salaries on our 
performance (MEAN IVG, SD IVG) and control variables to yield coefficient estimates 
at the 10th, 25th, 50th, 75th, and 90th percentiles (see Table 9). Intriguingly, while the 
average performance on different percentiles of salaries has similar effects, 
performance inconsistency at the 75th and 90th percentile have stronger effects, i.e., 
inconsistent players that are earning above median incomes earn much higher salary 
premia than below median. 
 
[Insert Table 9 here] 
 
To this point, our regression results confirm earlier findings in European 
football (Deutscher & Büschemann, 2016) and basketball (Bodvarsson & Brastow, 
1998). It seems that by using one single performance metric, inconsistent football 
players earn higher salaries than consistent ones. However, analyzing more detailed 
performance metrics, we show that inconsistency is not favored in all performance 
dimensions.  
Table 10 shows the regression results using our three factors from the factor 
analysis. High scores of playmaking, defensive, and striking skills each lead to 
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increased salaries in the OLS regression (model 1). Interestingly, however, we observe 
that an increase in the standard deviation of defensive skills significantly decreases 
salaries, while an increase in the standard deviation of striking skills raises salaries. It 
seems that the coefficient on standard deviation of playmaking skills is insignificant 
for salary determination. A one unit increase in standard deviation of defensive skills 
decreases salaries by 24.7%, while a one unit increase in standard deviation of striker 
skills increases salaries by 16.6%. 
We can see that inconsistency is not rewarded in every dimension, and in the 
defensive case, inconsistency is penalized. When we add player fixed effects to the 
regressions (model 2), inconsistency in these three different skills no longer plays a 
significant role. This could be due to unobserved heterogeneity that is captured by the 
player fixed effects in a panel structure where the number of players per group is 
rather small (less than three on average). Because of this feature of our data set, we 
prefer the OLS estimates over the player fixed effects estimates. 
The positive effect of performance coefficient variation on player salaries for 
strikers fits Lazear’s notion of ‘upside potential of risky workers’ but in our setting it 
is the more creative and more productive workers who gain from higher performance 
variation. Strikers are hired specifically to score goals. However, strikers’ own abilities 
may be thwarted by bad luck (Gauriot & Page, 2018) and the efforts of opposing 
defenders. Hence, the variation of striker performances within a given team-season 
can be substantial. In contrast, inconsistent performances by defenders will be viewed 
by team management as a threat to team wins. A given team’s defense needs to work 
together to prevent goals from being conceded to a team’s opponent in a given match. 
Erratic performances by defenders in terms of our factor loadings may be compensated 
by other attributes so the player is still selected for the team (because mean 
performance is still viewed as reasonable). However, salary for an inconsistent 
defender will tend to be lower than for a more consistent defender, ceteris paribus, 
where that condition includes mean performance over the season. 
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[Insert Table 10 here] 
 
In the quantile regressions (Table 11), we test the three factors for robustness. 
Similar to our OLS regressions, we can see that the key results persist. Greater 
inconsistency in defensive skills leads to significantly lower salaries at the 25th, 50th, 
and 75th percentile of the salary distribution, while inconsistency in striking skills has 
a positive and significant effect, although for the 10th, 75th, and 90th percentile but not 
at the median. 
The striker ‘upside potential’  wage premium is apparent at both extremes of 
the salary distribution. The strikers at the 10th percentile tend to be young and 
inexperienced players whose full potential has yet to be realized. These players fit the 
characterization of rookie players identified by Bollinger and Hotchkiss (2003) as new 
arrivals from the baseball draft in North America. Team managers welcome the future 
prospects of such emerging talent, recognizing that high mean performance comes 
with high inconsistency, partly due to inexperience.  
The 90th percentile is occupied by proven stars whose performance record is 
already known. Players at this level also deliver ‘upside potential’ but more in terms 
of winning key games that help a team towards winning championships and other 
trophies. Higher performance inconsistency, for the same mean level, is accompanied 
by the capability to win important games by a small margin, quite likely a single goal. 
That special match-winning and championship-winning capability is rewarded by 
higher salary.   
 
[Insert Table 11 here] 
 
Overall, our results are intriguing because they show (1) that only inconsistency 
in those actions that increase the chances of scoring are positively rewarded and (2) 
that single performance indicators, such as IVG or Kicker grades are highly skewed 
because of these scoring effects – an outcome bias that has been empirically 
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demonstrated by Gauriot and Page (2018). Attacking players need to be creative to 
improve their chances of scoring goals and this is what seems to be rewarded, both in 
mean and variance. In essence, similar to other industries with highly skewed positive 
returns (e.g., software), an additional goal scored (conceded) in one match can lead to 
extraordinary revenues (losses), i.e., returns of scoring are highly disproportional. This 
is one of the reasons offensive players that need to creatively outplay defenders to 
score goals are allowed to be inconsistent in comparison to defensive players. 
For defensive players, being inconsistent might lead to goals conceded by the 
opponent team. Contrary to offensive players, inconsistency in defense is penalized in 
salary. Just as scoring generates disproportionate positive returns, so too do mistakes 
in defensive areas generate disproportionate risks of conceding goals, i.e., negative 
returns. The results are in line with previous research in the software industry, where 
positive outcomes are highly skewed and software developers in these industries 
experience faster salary growth (Andersson et al., 2009). 
Moreover, the results indicate that inconsistency is rewarded for creative skills 
that have a high positive impact. Just as workers have different types of tasks where, 
for some, consistency in execution is preferred over creativity (e.g., highly repetitive 
and administrative tasks), there are other types of tasks where creativity and problem 
solving is much more important and therefore inconsistency might be highly 
rewarded.  
 
5. Discussion and Conclusion 
In this paper, we analyze whether inconsistent workers earn a salary premium. By 
analyzing 78,302 player-match observations over eight seasons (from 2009-10 to 2016-
17) in the Italian Serie A, we show that inconsistent players earn a salary premium 
when only one performance indicator is used to assess overall match performance. 
Analyzing more detailed performance metrics from on-field actions of the same 
players, we show that inconsistency is only rewarded for some dimensions of 
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performance, while it is penalized in others. That is, players that are inconsistent in 
defense are penalized, while offensive players earn a salary premium for being 
inconsistent. 
We confirm earlier results that used European football data to test whether 
performance inconsistency is rewarded. In contrast to previous research (Deutscher 
& Büschemann, 2016) we show that using single performance indicators for overall 
performances (e.g., expert ratings, grades, or single performance indices) is not 
sufficient to test this relationship, especially because single performance indicators 
cannot capture the complexity of different skillsets that are needed for different job 
roles. Here, we go further; we apply factor analysis and introduce three factors that 
capture the different skillsets that are needed on the field. These three factors 
correspond closely to player positions on the field. Using our three components, we 
show that greater inconsistency is rewarded in salary for players with high scores in 
attacking skillsets, but it is penalized in salary for defensive players. To the best of our 
knowledge, this is the first paper that can show these relationships in detail for 
subgroups of workers in team production. Our results suggest that a simple focus on 
performance variation in one metric is inadequate for consideration of salary 
determination.  
Although we exploit a rich data set for our paper, there are also technical 
limitations regarding our performance metrics. Measuring individual performance in 
team competitions is not always conclusive. While an attacking player’s performance 
can be measured in the number of dribbles, shots on target, assists, or goals, it is much 
more difficult to measure the individual performance of a defensive or midfield player. 
Because good defending is usually a team effort requiring considerable coordination 
among team members. Midfield players have both attacking and defensive 
responsibilities including regaining possession for their team and the effort provided 
in that task is hard to capture empirically. 
Moreover, positional play in defense is an important skill that cannot be as 
easily measured compared to blocked shots or tackles. In some cases, a tackle might 
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even be an outcome of bad positional play. In that sense, the action and event statistics 
that are gathered for defensive players might not fully cover their actual performances. 
A tackle that has occurred can be both an outcome of good defending or bad defending 
depending on the situation in a game. This is a common problem in football: data 
providers can gather events and measure what is happening on the field, while they 
cannot gather what is not happening, e.g., a lost attacking chance because the 
defending team had extraordinary positional play or because of poor decision-making 
by the attackers. As sports analytics develops further, we expect better metrics for all 
players to emerge with explicit consideration of the context for player actions. Such 
improved measures will greatly facilitate analysis of salary determination in team 
sports.  
Notwithstanding issues with performance evaluation in football, our results 
point to an interesting and important separation of effects of performance 
inconsistency on salary. Creative and star performers appear to be rewarded for 
inconsistent outcomes. Workers who perform more mundane but essential tasks, who 
are not primarily responsible for spectacular payoffs for their employers, appear to be 
rewarded for consistent outcomes. That polarity in our results merits further research 
in other labor market settings.  
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Table 1: Definitions of observed variables for factor analysis. 
Accurate crosses Accurate passes from a wide position to a central attacking area. 
Accurate long balls Accurate passes of 22.83 meters or more. 
Accurate through balls Accurate passes between opposition players in their defensive 
line to find an onrushing teammate (running through on goal). 
Aerial duels won Winning a header in a direct contest with an opponent. 
Anticipations Preventing an opponent's pass from reaching their teammates. 
Assists Pass leading to scoring a goal. 
Balls played Total number of played balls. 
Balls played in opp. half Total number of played balls in the opposition half. 
Blocked shot An outfield player’s prevention of an opponent’s shot reaching 
the goal. 
Clearances Defending player that removes the attacking threat on their goal, 
effectively alleviating pressure on their goal. 
Counterattack An attack made in response to one by an opponent. 
Fast breaks Attempts to move the ball up the pitch and into scoring position 
as quickly as possible. 
Goal chances Players’ opportunity to score a goal. 
Goals Scoring a goal. 
Goals from inside goal 
area 
Goal scored inside the box. 
Interceptions Preventing an opponent's pass from reaching their teammates 
leading to ball possession. 
Recovered balls Recovering the ball and keeping possession of the ball. 
Recovered balls in def. 
area 
Recovering the ball and keeping possession (defensive area). 
Shots Total number of player’s shots. 
Shots on target Attempts to score which required intervention to stop it from 
resulting in a goal. 
Successful passes Passes from a player to a teammate. 
Total tackles Dispossessing an opponent, whether the tackling player comes 
away with the ball or not. 
Useful dribbles Dribbles that provide an advantage. 
Useful plays Plays that generate an advantage in favor of the team that 
possesses the ball. 
Useful plays in opp.half Plays that generate an advantage in favor of the team possessing 
of the ball (opposition’s half). 
Useful short passes in 
opp. half 
Short passes that generate an advantage in favor of the team 
possessing the ball (opposition half). 
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics of on-field metrics (observed variables) used for factor analysis. 
Variable Obs. Mean SD Min Max 
Balls played 78,302 40.572  22.428  0 196 
Balls played in opp. half 78,302 19.634  14.603  0 131 
Successful passes 78,302 25.844  17.405  0 176 
Useful plays 78,302 6.830  5.723  0 76 
Useful plays in opp. half 78,302 3.357  3.538  0 48 
Recovered balls 78,302 10.446  7.627  0 50 
Recovered balls in def. area 78,302 5.244  5.613  0 35 
Anticipations 78,302 1.453  1.983  0 23 
Counterattack 78,302 0.514  0.807  0 8 
Fast breaks 78,302 1.933  1.944  0 18 
Useful dribblings 78,302 0.595  1.029  0 14 
Assists 78,302 0.644  0.979  0 10 
Goal chances 78,302 0.350  0.714  0 8 
Shots 78,302 0.973  1.328  0 13 
Goal from inside goal area 78,302 0.019  0.138  0 3 
Useful short passes in opp. 78,302 0.927  2.002  0 39 
Shots on target 78,302 0.343  0.687  0 8 
Aerials won 78,302 0.993  1.412  0 15 
Total tackles 78,302 1.553  1.658  0 16 
Interceptions 78,302 1.299  1.569  0 13 
Clearances 78,302 2.135  3.027  0 29 
Blocked shots 78,302 0.241  0.563  0 7 
Accurate crosses 78,302 0.381  0.820  0 11 
Accurate long balls 78,302 2.033  2.634  0 29 
Accurate through balls 78,302 0.094  0.345  0 6 
Goals 78,302 0.091  0.318  0 5 
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Table 3: Factor Analysis. 
Factor Eigenvalue Differences Proportion Cumulative 
Factor1 6.06159 1.53575 0.4287 0.4287 
Factor2 4.52584 2.54691 0.3201 0.7488 
Factor3 1.97894 1.34984 0.14 0.8888 
Factor4 0.62909 0.0682 0.0445 0.9332 
Factor5 0.56089 0.18724 0.0397 0.9729 
Factor6 0.37364 0.05432 0.0264 0.9993 
Factor7 0.31932 0.07022 0.0226 1.0219 
Factor8 0.2491 0.05942 0.0176 1.0395 
Factor9 0.18968 0.03235 0.0134 1.053 
Factor10 0.15733 0.0447 0.0111 1.0641 
Factor11 0.11263 0.05272 0.008 1.072 
Factor12 0.05991 0.03381 0.0042 1.0763 
Factor13 0.0261 0.00964 0.0018 1.0781 
Factor14 0.01646 0.02975 0.0012 1.0793 
Factor15 -0.01329 0.01194 -0.0009 1.0784 
Factor16 -0.02524 0.00395 -0.0018 1.0766 
Factor17 -0.02918 0.0386 -0.0021 1.0745 
Factor18 -0.06778 0.0122 -0.0048 1.0697 
Factor19 -0.07998 0.00193 -0.0057 1.0641 
Factor20 -0.08191 0.00491 -0.0058 1.0583 
Factor21 -0.08682 0.00161 -0.0061 1.0521 
Factor22 -0.08843 0.02903 -0.0063 1.0459 
Factor23 -0.11745 0.03034 -0.0083 1.0376 
Factor24 -0.1478 0.04177 -0.0105 1.0271 
Factor25 -0.18957 0.00413 -0.0134 1.0137 
Factor26 -0.1937 . -0.0137 1 
Number of observations: 78,302  Retained factors: 3 
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Table 4: Factor Analysis – Rotated Factors (oblique promax). 
Factor Variance Proportion Rotated factors are correlated 
Factor1 5.33453 0.3773   
Factor2 5.06215 0.358   
Factor3 3.22875 0.2284   
Number of observations: 78,302  Retained factors: 3 
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Table 5: Rotated (oblique promax) factor loadings and pattern matrix. 
Variable 
 
Factor1 
Playmaking 
Factor2 
Defense 
Factor3 
Striker 
Uniqueness 
 
Balls played 0.772  0.450  0.057  0.118  
Balls played in opp. half 0.818  -0.242  0.179  0.213  
Successful passes 0.741  0.404  -0.050  0.215  
Useful plays 0.851  0.229  -0.080  0.184  
Useful plays in opp. half 0.904  -0.236  0.017  0.170  
Recovered balls 0.220  0.904  0.016  0.095  
Recovered balls in def. area -0.069  0.946  0.005  0.120  
Anticipations 0.030  0.700  0.005  0.506  
Counterattack 0.182  0.181  0.017  0.927  
Fast breaks 0.528  0.392  -0.086  0.508  
Useful dribblings 0.375  -0.162  0.171  0.781  
Assists 0.520  -0.236  0.103  0.661  
Goal chances -0.006  0.026  0.834  0.318  
Shots 0.198  -0.085  0.715  0.364  
Goal from inside goal area -0.101  0.106  0.425  0.841  
Useful short passes in opp. half 0.494  -0.048  -0.063  0.767  
Shots on target 0.020  0.021  0.828  0.318  
Aerials duels won -0.041  0.409  0.163  0.849  
Total tackles 0.261  0.363  -0.047  0.770  
Interceptions 0.124  0.578  -0.021  0.627  
Clearances -0.167  0.804  0.047  0.379  
Blocked shots -0.068  0.413  0.011  0.835  
Accurate crosses 0.462  -0.204  -0.016  0.771  
Accurate long balls 0.413  0.350  -0.062  0.666  
Accurate through balls 0.265  -0.119  0.066  0.908  
Goals -0.096  0.112  0.726  0.524  
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Table 6: List of dependent and independent variables and their descriptions. 
Variable Description 
LN(SALARYt) Natural logarithm of salary in season t. 
MEAN IVGt-1 Average performance in season t-1. 
SD IVG t-1 Standard deviation of performance in season t-1. 
PLAYMAKING t-1 Average playmaking skills in season t-1. 
SD PLAYMAKING t-1 Standard deviation of playmaking skills in season t-1. 
DEFENSE t-1 Average defensive skills in season t-1. 
SD DEFENSE t-1 Standard deviation of defensive skills in season t-1. 
STRIKER t-1 Average striking/scoring skills in season t-1. 
SD STRIKER t-1 Standard striking/scoring skills in season t-1. 
AGEt Age of player in season t. 
AGEt2 Age squared of player in season t. 
CAREERGAMESt Cumulative number of career games in the Serie A in season t. 
CAREERGAMES t2 Cumulative number of career games sq. in the Serie A in season t. 
NATIONALTEAMt Dummy = 1 if appeared in the national team squad in season t. 
DEFENDERt Dummy = 1 if player is a defender. 
MIDFIELDERt Dummy = 1 if player is a midfielder. 
FORWARDt Dummy = 1 if player is a forward. 
NONEU Dummy = 1 if player is a non-European player. 
Team dummies Dummy variable for team. 
Season dummies Dummy variable for season. 
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Table 7: Descriptive statistics of dependent and independent variables. 
Variable Obs. Mean SD Min Max 
LN(SALARYt) 2,049 7.308  0.808  4.094  9.616 
MEAN IVGt-1 2,049 17.744  1.523  11.733  23.323 
SD IVG t-1 2,049 2.761  0.689  0.212  6.241  
PLAYMAKING t-1 2,049 0.074  0.645  -1.228  3.831  
SD PLAYMAKING t-1 2,049 0.684  0.251  0.019  2.055  
DEFENSE t-1 2,049 0.096  0.819  -1.268  2.242  
SD DEFENSE t-1 2,049 0.503  0.230  0.043  1.300  
SRIKER t-1 2,049 -0.016  0.565  -0.801  3.320  
SD STRIKER t-1 2,049 0.631  0.390  0.010  2.241  
AGEt 2,049 28.128  4.147  17.000  40.800 
AGEt2 2,049 808.372  236.167  289.000  1,664.640  
CAREERGAMESt 2,049 138.226  100.027  5.000  619.0 
CAREERGAMES t2 2,049 29,106.9  42,486  25.0  383,161 
NATIONALTEAMt 2,049 0.540  0.499  0 1.000  
DEFENDERt 2,049 0.368  0.482  0 1.000  
MIDFIELDERt 2,049 0.429  0.495  0 1.000  
FORWARDt 2,049 0.203  0.402  0 1.000  
NONEU 2,049 0.424  0.494  0 1.000  
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Table 8: Estimation results for OLS and FE regressions (IVG). 
Dependent variable: 
LN(SALARYt) 
OLS 
(1) 
FE 
(2) 
OLS 
(corr. IVG) 
(3) 
FE 
(corr. IVG) 
(4) 
MEAN IVGt-1 0.074*** 0.005 0.080*** 0.017 
 (0.008) (0.010) (0.012) (0.012) 
SD IVGt-1 0.079*** 0.040*** 0.131*** 0.056*** 
 (0.016) (0.015) (0.016) (0.016) 
AGEt 0.374*** 0.410*** 0.372*** 0.398*** 
 (0.038) (0.073) (0.038) (0.072) 
AGEt2 -0.006*** -0.009*** -0.006*** -0.009*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
CAREERGAMESt 0.002*** 0.007*** 0.002*** 0.007*** 
 (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) 
CAREERGAMESt2 -0.000** -0.000*** -0.000** -0.000*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
NATIONALTEAMt 0.115***  0.095***  
 (0.023)  (0.023)  
MIDFIELDt 0.062***  0.025  
 (0.024)  (0.022)  
FORWARDt 0.259***  0.246***  
 (0.033)  (0.031)  
NONEU 0.100***  0.095***  
 (0.023)  (0.023)  
Constant -0.339 1.841 -0.446 1.816 
 (0.554) (1.335) (0.564) (1.339) 
     
Observations 2,049 2,049 2,049 2,049 
Number of Players  725  725 
R2 0.723 0.526 0.731 0.533 
Adj. R2 0.716 0.516 0.724 0.522 
Season Dummies YES YES YES YES 
Team Dummies YES YES YES YES 
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 9: Estimation results for quantile regressions (IVG). 
Dependent variable: 
LN(SALARYt) 
(1) 
10th pctile 
(2) 
25th pctile 
(3) 
Median 
(4) 
75th pctile 
(5) 
90th pctile 
MEAN IVGt-1 0.088*** 0.066*** 0.072*** 0.066*** 0.067*** 
 (0.013) (0.010) (0.009) (0.010) (0.013) 
SD IVGt-1 0.056** 0.059*** 0.063*** 0.106*** 0.106*** 
 (0.024) (0.020) (0.018) (0.020) (0.025) 
Constant -3.886*** -1.431** -0.237 2.078*** 2.175*** 
 (0.705) (0.565) (0.525) (0.567) (0.732) 
      
Observations 2,049 2,049 2,049 2,049 2,049 
Pseudo R2 0.420 0.469 0.507 0.537 0.537 
Controls YES YES YES YES YES 
Season Dummies YES YES YES YES YES 
Team Dummies YES YES YES YES YES 
Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05 
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Table 10: Estimation results for OLS and FE regressions (FA). 
Dependent variable: 
LN(SALARYt) 
OLS 
(1) 
FE 
(2) 
PLAYMAKINGt-1 0.117*** 0.083*** 
 (0.028) (0.026) 
SD PLAYMAKINGt-1 0.021 0.066 
 (0.074) (0.059) 
DEFENSEt-1 0.194*** -0.016 
 (0.029) (0.036) 
SD DEFENSEt-1 -0.247*** -0.045 
 (0.087) (0.068) 
STRIKERt-1 0.226*** 0.060 
 (0.049) (0.054) 
SD STRIKERt-1 0.166*** 0.069 
 (0.059) (0.052) 
AGEt 0.351*** 0.389*** 
 (0.038) (0.071) 
AGEt2 -0.006*** -0.009*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) 
CAREERGAMESt 0.002*** 0.007*** 
 (0.000) (0.001) 
CAREERGAMESt2 -0.000 -0.000*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
NATIONALTEAMt 0.080***  
 (0.023)  
MIDFIELDt 0.084***  
 (0.031)  
FORWARDt 0.266***  
 (0.053)  
NONEU 0.106***  
 (0.022)  
Constant 1.543*** 2.265* 
 (0.531) (1.306) 
   
Observations 2,049 2,049 
R2 0.739 0.538 
Adj. R2 0.732 0.526 
Season Dummies YES YES 
Team Dummies YES YES 
Number of Players  725 
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 11: Estimation results for quantile regressions with factor scores. 
Dependent variable: 
LN(SALARYt) 
(1) 
10th pctile 
(2) 
25th pctile 
(3) 
Median 
(4) 
75th pctile 
(5) 
90th pctile 
PLAYMAKINGt-1 0.114*** 0.105*** 0.142*** 0.147*** 0.132*** 
 (0.039) (0.032) (0.031) (0.030) (0.042) 
SD PLAYMAKINGt-1 0.056 0.112 -0.077 -0.044 -0.075 
 (0.098) (0.080) (0.078) (0.076) (0.104) 
DEFENSEt-1 0.180*** 0.215*** 0.177*** 0.143*** 0.135*** 
 (0.041) (0.033) (0.033) (0.032) (0.044) 
SD DEFENSEt-1 -0.178 -0.174* -0.248*** -0.224** -0.184 
 (0.114) (0.093) (0.091) (0.088) (0.122) 
STRIKERt-1 0.178** 0.290*** 0.295*** 0.184*** 0.166** 
 (0.071) (0.057) (0.056) (0.054) (0.075) 
SD STRIKERt-1 0.220** 0.074 0.082 0.190*** 0.221** 
 (0.088) (0.071) (0.070) (0.068) (0.094) 
Constant -1.504** 0.946* 2.257*** 3.532*** 3.759*** 
 (0.649) (0.526) (0.514) (0.501) (0.690) 
      
Observations 2,049 2,049 2,049 2,049 2,049 
Pseudo R2 0.434 0.486 0.527 0.555 0.550 
Controls YES YES YES YES YES 
Season Dummies YES YES YES YES YES 
Team Dummies YES YES YES YES YES 
Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05 
 
